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Suppose you were located behind a veil of ignorance and given the choice as to whether to 
receive your health care in a Bismarck social insurance system or a tax-based Beveridge system.  
How much confidence could you have in your ability to choose prudently, as judged by the 
health outcomes you could rationally expect to enjoy, based solely on the knowledge of which 
type of system you would be treated in?  If Or and her colleagues are right, the answer is ‘not 
very much’.  A simple rank-ordering of Bismarck and Beveridge systems would be of limited 
use in terms of predicting health outcomes, especially if your choice were limited to one 
between the social insurance countries of France and Germany or the tax-based systems of 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK. In particular, if your ranking were based solely on the health 
outcomes associated with each type of system, you would rationally opt for either France or 
Sweden, a preference that - unhappily for health policy comparativists - straddles the 
Beveridge/Bismarck divide. 
 
Now suppose that your veil of ignorance were lifted somewhat, and you knew that you would 
be a man in his fifties.  In that case you would have good reason to choose either of the social 
insurance systems over any of the others, since five-year survival rates for prostate cancer are 
higher in France and Germany - 73.7% and 76.4% respectively as reported - than for any of 
the three tax-based systems, the best of which is in Sweden (66.0%) and the worst in Denmark 
(38.4%).  On the other hand, as a woman concerned about breast cancer, by the same test of 
survival rates, you would opt for Sweden (82.0% compared to the next best of 79.8% in France).  
Suppose we imagine the thought-experiment of asking rational decision makers still in the 
womb to make a prudent choice of country, then, given live birth survival rates, they would 
also opt for Sweden, with France second.  Finally, for those on the verge of retirement, life-
expectancy at 65 years is pretty evenly split between France (20.4) and Sweden (19.2).  Putting 
these results together, the overall result of all these possible comparisons is that, as Or et al. 
(2010: 272) summarise, there is ‘no clear-cut distinction between Beveridge and Bismarck-
type countries.  France and Sweden consistently outperform the UK and Denmark while 
Germany is typically placed in between.’  
 
This conclusion is also notable for the fact that it is broadly consistent with an earlier study by 
Figueres el al. (2004), which compared the performance of eight social insurance countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland) 
against a range of tax-based systems.  Figueres et al. do not use the same measures of health 
outcomes as Or et al., focusing instead on life-expectancy and avoidable mortality.  However, 
by their measures Germany is located below France and Sweden, the two top performers, and 
above the UK and Denmark, the relative laggards.   
 
Comparison between Beveridge and Bismarck schemes becomes even more complex once the 
effects of country selection are taken into account.  Consider the question of waiting-times, 
which is one variable for which Or et al. do note a systemic difference between their social 
insurance and tax-based schemes.  This clarity of this difference disappears in the Figueres et 
al. (2004: 100) study, because the Netherlands shows comparatively long waiting-times.  
Similarly, the better performance of tax-based systems on the question of cost-control, another 
systematic difference noted by Or et al., is thrown into doubt by the comparison between Spain 
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and Portugal.  Both spent a similar proportion of GDP on health in 1980 (around 5.5%) but 
Portugal increased its spend to 9.0% in 2000 while Spain increased its spend only to 7.5% of 
GDP (Figueres et al. 2004: 118).  Even in 2011, after the effects of the recession and austerity 
budgets, Portugal still recorded a spend of 10.2% of GDP compared to 9.3% for Spain (OECD, 
2013: Table A.6). 
 
In short, for our hypothetical decision maker located behind a veil of ignorance, the bare 
knowledge that one system fell into the social insurance category and another system fell into 
the tax-based category would be little help in making a prudent choice between them.  As far 
as health system performance goes, within group variance is large relative to between-group 
variance.  Given these findings, is there any point in continuing to think about the difference 
between Bismarck and Beveridge systems?  Even if we suppose that we are not in the game of 
ranking countries, with the folly that such exercises involve (Oliver, 2012), there is still the 
question of whether the distinction between Bismarck and Beveridge systems remains useful, 
a view that some have doubted on the grounds that social insurance schemes have come to rely 
more heavily on tax-based funding (Saltman, 2012: 12).  If outcomes overlap and sources of 
funding are becoming more similar, does the distinction still serve any useful purpose? 
 
One possible reason for a positive answer to this question relates less to health outcomes, which 
given the range and diversity of factors that bear on health status will always be hard to relate 
to organisational differences, and more to the norms of governance characteristic of each 
system.  From a narrow health economics viewpoint, such matters are relatively unimportant.  
Governance structures are just different forms of production that matter only insofar as they 
yield different outcomes.  As Alexander Pope once put it:  ‘For forms of government, let fools 
contest.  Whate’re is best administered is best.’  However, health care institutions are an 
important element in a society’s basic institutional structure, and there are typically good 
historical and cultural reasons why a system takes the particular form it does and remains 
relatively stable in its essentials over time.  For example, the decentralised nature of German 
policy-making is not just a policy preference, but is built into Germany’s Basic Law and the 
constitutional norms that Law embodies.  In this context, pressures to centralisation are likely 
to be met by considerable resistance on the part of independent bodies (Kieslich, 2012: 375).  
By the same token, political developments of a general kind outside the health care sector may 
well have considerable implications for health care governance.  In the UK in particular, the 
devolution of power to the constituent nations of the Union since 1997 has had important 
consequences for the organisation of health care, leading, as Or et al. note, to different decisions 
between Scotland and Wales on the one hand and England on the other about the purchaser-
provider split.  (In this context, however, I note that Or et al. flip-flop a number of times in the 
reporting of their data between ‘England’ and the ‘UK’, suggesting that there are nuances to 
the issues of centralisation and decentralisation that have not found their way into the analysis.) 
 
Questions about the centralisation or decentralisation of decision making are not simply 
technical matters of decision structures but they have an importance of their own.  Observers 
have noted for example that the German sickness funds attach great weight to their autonomy 
and independence.  The effect seems to be to diffuse controversy about health policy, by 
contrast with the UK’s National Health Service, in which relatively detailed matters of service 
provision and performance can suddenly become political hot potatoes.  I have not seen a 
thorough comparative content-analytical study, but those who know both the UK and Germany 
are struck by the contrast between the political prominence of health policy in the former but 
not in the latter.  (It is, of course, an interesting question as to whether or not policy-making is 
better when conducted in the glare of political controversy.) 
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Questions of organisational and constitutional structure are closely related to the values that 
different systems pursue.  One of the most interesting, but underdeveloped, aspects of the 
analysis by Or et al. (2010: Table 1) is their discussion of the social values and animating 
principles of the different types of system.  According to their analysis, Beveridge systems are 
based upon the principles of universality and equity, whereas the social insurance systems are 
based on the principles of plurality, liberty and solidarity.  However, earlier in the paper they 
write that the ‘principal objectives of the healthcare system in all countries are to optimise 
health outcomes, quality of care, ease and equity of access, subject to the constraints of 
containing costs’ (Or et al., 2010: 271).  A way of reconciling these two sets of statements is 
to assume that there is a list of objectives that all systems might be thought to pursue, but in 
practice, given organisational constraints, some will score well on some values, whereas others 
will score well in different terms. 
 
However, this way of thinking ignores the extent to which values are endogenous to political 
organisation and culture.  Consider the contrast between the principles of equity and solidarity 
for example.  Both principles underwrite universal access, understood as a reduction in the 
financial and other barriers to access that citizens confront.  From this point of view, the claim 
that one type of system favours universality whereas another type does not involves some 
category mistake.  However, the meaning of universal access is different in the two conceptions.  
The principle of equity makes sense in a system in which the policy-making problem is one in 
which the central dilemma for the government is to allocate resources efficiently between 
competing uses.  In a fixed budget system, like that of the UK, the equity principle is there to 
guide the way in which the government, as a benevolent central social planner, allocates its 
resources.  By contrast, the principle of solidarity makes sense in a system in which the 
fundamental purpose of social insurance is financial risk-pooling, and in which the normal 
actuarial principles of risk-discrimination are not allowed to operate for reasons of communal 
cohesion (Saltman, 2004: 5).  This does not mean that the principle of solidarity has no 
conceivable role in UK health policy.  Policies on blood and organ donation may well be 
thought of in these terms.  However, when thinking about financial provision, solidarity as a 
principle does not make sense outside of a system in which autonomous funds act on the 
principle of pooling their own funds across social groups.  Conversely, equity, when it means 
more than a principle of universal access, has no meaning in a system in which there is a 
plurality of payers responsible for their own funds, rather than a central social planner seeking 
to allocate resources. 
 
To note these points might seem to preclude any comparative analysis.  If concepts are only 
meaningful within an institutionally embedded policy paradigm, we cannot generalise even 
within the class of Beveridge or Bismarck-type schemes.  However, this would be too strong a 
conclusion.   The members of each class might have strong family resemblances to one another, 
even when they were not prepared to speak the language of other families.  Our hypothetical 
agent behind the veil of ignorance will require the art of translation as well as the ability to 
rank alternatives.  
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